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Banking  plays  two  roles  in  a  modern  capitalist  economy:  i  t 
supplies  the  means  of  payments  and  it  channels  resources  into  the 
capital  development  of  the  economy.  On  both  scores  these  banking 
functions  are  being  performed  to  a  decreasing  extent  by 
organizations  that  are  chartered  as  banks  and  it  seems,  caeter:ls 
paribus,  that  the  trend  will  continue. 
These  developments  suggest  that  the  role  in  the  economy  (of 
government  organizations  (Central  Banks,  broadly  defined)--to 
supervise,  regulate,  and  examine  banks;  to  "control"  the  growth 
of  bank  money;  and  to  assure  that  those  bank  liabilities  that 
function  as  part  of  the  payments  mechanism  are  always  available 
at  par  --needs  to  be  reviewed.  The  "declining"  role  of  banks  has 
significance  for  the  efficacy  of  monetary  policy  operations.  The 
channels  by  which  Federal  Reserve  operations  affect  the  economy 
may  no  longer  be  by  changing  the  availability  or  cost  of 
financing,  but  rather  by  affecting  uncertainty:  by  affecting  the 
evaluation  by  portfolio  managers  of  the  viability  of  enterprises 
and  the  stability  of  markets.  When  Central  Bank  operations 
affect  the  evaluation  of  uncertainty  by  financial  market  agents, 2 
market  reactions  will  often  be  out  of  line  with  the  size  of  the 
operations.  1 
The  decrease  in  the  weight  of  banks  in  financing  the  capital 
development  of  the  economy  tends  to  increase  the  significance  of 
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  relative  to  that  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System.  That  some  major  organizations  that  are 
chartered  as  commercial  banks  operate  more  like  investment  banks 
is  an  issue  bond  rating  firms  are  facing,  even  as  our  regulatory 
structure  for  banks  remains  frozen  and  unchanging.  The  policy 
problem  that  emerges  from  the  decline  in  the  relative  importance 
of  institutions  chartered  as  banks  is  whether  the  existing 
institutional  structure  of  regulation  and  supervision  of 
financial  institutions  needs  to  be  changed  in  a  serious  way. 
In  general,  the  discourse  on  economic  policy  takes  place  on 
two  "planes."  One  is  that  of  the  day-to-day  operations  of  the 
"authorities"  and  the  rules,  if  any,  that  should  guide  them.  The 
second  plane  is  that  of  the  legislation  (and  administrative 
decisions)  that  affects  the  structure  and  operations  of  banking 
and  financial  markets,  and  the  government  involvement  in  setting 
rules  that  constrain  and  contain  banking  and  financial  markets. 
This  paper  concentrates  on  policy  on  the  second  "legislating 
institutions  and  usages"  plane. 
II.  Theoretical  Background 
Every  economic  policy  argument  reflects  a  maintained 
economic  theory.  It  behooves  anyone  who  analyzes  and  advocates 
economic  policy  to  make  "where  he  is  coming  from"  clear.  This  is 
especially  true  if  the  maintained  theory  of  the  analyst  is 
significantly  different  from  the  conventional  or  orthodox  theory 
of  the  day. 3 
This  comment  is  written  from  the  perspective  of  the 
financial  instability  hypothesis  interpretation  of  The  General 
Theory  of  Keynes.  This  interpretation  holds  that  in  The  General 
Theory  Keynes  set  out  the  foundations  of  an  investment  theory  of 
business  cycles  and  a  financial  theory  of  investment  for 
capitalist  economies.  Interactions  among  processes  that 
determine  investment  demand,  financing  conditions,  aggregate 
demand,  and  the  distribution  of  income  determine  the  path  through 
time  of  the  economy. 
This  Keynesian  view  differs  quite  radically  from  the 
orthodox  "neo-classical"  economic  theory,  which  leads  to 
propositions  about  the  properties  of  the  static  equilibrium  of  an 
abstract  economy  that  is  fully  specified  by  production  functions, 
utility  functions  over  "real  variables",  and  maximizing  behavior. 
One  proposition  of  the  neo-classical  theory  is  that  money  is 
neutral.  Keynes  described  the  effort  that  went  into  the  creation 
of  The  General  Theory  as  a  process  of  escaping  ".  .  .  from  the 
confusions  of  the  Quantity  Theory,  which  once  entangled  me. 112 
In  the  theory  Keynes  developed,  upon  which  the  financial 
instability  hypothesis  is built,  money  and  finance  are  in  general 
not  neutral.  In  particular,  changes  in  monetary  and  financial 
institutions  will  affect  the  path  of  the  economy  through  time. 
This  non-neutrality  of  money  is  not  the  result  of  special 
circumstances  such  as  rigid  wages,  but  rather  because  money 
enters  in  quite  different  ways  into  the  determination  of  the 
money  prices  of  current  outputs  and  the  money  price  of  capital 
assets. 3 
In  the  financial  instability  hypothesis,  the  economy  is 
viewed  as  a  set  of  interacting,  interdependent  processes  that 
generate  the  path  of  the  pertinent  economic  variables  through 
real  time.  The  results  of  multi-market  interactions  are  most 4 
often  tranquil,  but  from  time  to  time  the  cumulative  effect  of 
the  interacting  processes  generates  turbulent  conditions  as  well 
as  incoherent  behavior.  This  theory  holds  that  periods  of 
incoherent  behavior  occur  as  a  natural  outcome  of  the 
interactions  between  flows  of  income,  payment  flows  due  to 
financial  commitments  and  the  prices  of  assets  as  determined  in 
markets.  These  interactions  reflect  the  essential  characteristic 
of  a  capitalist  economy,  that  it  is  simultaneously  an  income 
generating  system  and  a  financial  system.' 
Economic  turbulence  and  incoherence  are  associated  with  both 
deep  depressions  and  severe  inflations:  they  lead  to  serious 
systemic  deviations  of  output  from  potential  output.  Whereas  the 
orthodox  theory  finds  that  decentralized  market  processes  lead  to 
optimums,  the  financial  instability  hypothesis  holds  that  the 
outcomes  of  capitalist  market  processes  are  often  seriously 
flawed.  However,  the  full  effect  of  these  flaws,  such  as  deep 
and  long  depressions,  can  be  contained  by  apt  economic  policies.  5 
In  the  financial  instability  hypothesis,  business  cycles 
mainly  result  from  interactions  between  payment  commitments, 
which  arise  in  the  process  of  financing  investments  and  positions 
in  capital  assets,  and  the  flows  of  gross  capital  incomes,  which 
are  determined  by  the  structure  of  aggregate  demand:  business 
cycles  are  endogenous  in  capitalist  economies.  Gross  capital 
incomes  can  be  either  more  than  sufficient,  sufficient,  or 
insufficient  to  fulfill  payment  commitments  made  during  prior 
financings.  In  the  simple  skeletal  case,  investment  spending 
determines  the  cash  flows  available  for  validating  the  prices 
paid  for  capital  assets  and  financial  instruments,  as  well  as 
fulfilling  commitments  embodied  in  liability  structures  which 
were  entered  into  in  order  to  finance  investments  and  positions 
in  assets. 5 
In  our  complex  world,  households,  government  units,  and 
foreign  governments  and  enterprises  have  outstanding  debts,  and 
debt-finance  some  of  their  activities  internationally.  They, 
too,  need  to  validate  debts  inherited  from  the  past,  even  as  they 
finance  some  current  demands  for  goods  and  services  with  new 
debts.6 
III  Debt  Deflations 
The  financial  instability  hypothesis  as  an  interpretation  of 
Keynes  starts  with  two  observations: 
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with  Irving  Fisher's  Debt  Deflation  Theory 
of  Great  Depressions.  8 
In  Fisher's  argument,  overindebtedness  is  an  initial 
condition  for  a  debt  deflation.  This  arises  out  of  the  changes 
in  the  way  investment  and  positions  in  capital  assets  are 
financed  as  the  economy  enjoys  an  extended  period  of  good  times. 
Institutional  changes,  in  the  form  of  new  institutions,  new 
instruments,  and  market  innovations,  are  one  aspect  of  the  way 
financing  changes  over  extended  periods  of  good  times.  In 
addition,  as  is  especially  evident  these  days,  financial 
practices  adjust  to  new  technologies  of  communicating,  computing, 
and  access  to  files. 
Fisher  did  not  explain  how  overindebtedness  developed.  It 
is  now  clear  that  over  an  extended  period  of  good  times,  during 6 
which  the  use  of  debt  leads  to  well-advertised  gains,  prior 
wariness  of  the  use  of  debt  attenuates.  The  subjective 
evaluation  of  the  likelihood  of  project  failure  diminishes  even 
as  the  margin  of  safety  in  liability  structures  diminishes,  as 
ever-larger  proportions  of  expected  cash  flows  are  pledged  by 
outstanding  contracts  to  service  debts.  Subjective  views 
uncertainty  being  carried  decrease  even  as  the 
articulation  of  debt  payments  and  the  income  to  fund 
payments  increases  the  objective  chances  of  contracts  not 
fulfilled. 
Impact  of  the  Great  Depression 
After  1933,  when  the  pieces  left  behind  by  the 





contraction  of  1929-33  had  to  be  picked  up  and  put  together,  the 
current  interpretation  of  the  great  depression  emphasized 
weaknesses  in  the  financial  structure,  running  all  the  way  from 
the  information  that  corporations  provided  to  their  investors  and 
potential  investors  to  the  organization  and  powers  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System. 
The  Federal  Reserve  System  was  created  in  the  aftermath  of 
the  panic  of  1907.  One  motive  for  its  founding  was  to  make 
future  financial  crashes  impossible.  As  the  Federal  Reserve  was 
unable  to  stem  the  wave  of  insolvency  of  banks  and  firms  over  the 
1929-33  period,  a  consensus  developed  that  a  retooling  of  the 
Government's  interface  with  the  banking  and  financial  system  was 
needed:  some  device  other  than  the  Federal  Reserve's  discount 
window  had  to  be  put  in  place  to  contain  solvency  crises. 
The  banking  and  financial  legislation  of  the  era  of  the 
Great  Depression  had  two  phases:  first  came  emergency  provisions 
and  then,  after  a period  of  study  and  debate,  reform:  the  setting 
in  place  of  a  "permanent"  structure.  The  second  phase  took  place mainly  in  1935  and  1936.  The  object  of  reform  was  to  set  in 
place  a  structure  so  that  a  financial  collapse  leading  to  a great 
depression  could  not  happen  again.' 
IV.  The  Reforms  of  the  1930's 
Much  of  the  economic  history  of  the  United  States  could  be 
written  in  terms  of  attempts  to  get  money  right.  After  a 
particular  monetary,  banking,  and  financing  structure  had  failed, 
either  economically  or  politically,  a  new  structure  was  put  in 
place.  This  history  of  reform  and  subsequent  failure,  followed 
by  another  round  of  reform,  reflects  the  two  not  completely 
compatible  requirements  placed  upon  the  monetary  and  banking 
system:  to  provide  a  safe  and  sound  medium  of  exchange,  and  to 
furnish  channels  for  the  financing  of  the  capital  development  of 
the  economy. 
Compartmentalization  and  Transparency 
Two  principles,  compartmentalization  and  transparency,  can 
be  said  to  have  governed  the  legislation  in  the  mid-1930's  that 
reformed  the  private  monetary,  banking,  and  financial  systems  and 
the  government's  regulatory  structure.  The  basic  structure  set 
in  place  in  the  mid-1930's  is  still  largely  in  place. 
Compartmentalization  means  that  the  financial  industry  is 
divided  into  compartments,  within  which  special-purpose  or 
limited-domain  institutions  have  protected  market  positions  in 
particular  types  of  financing,  in  the  financing  of  particular 
industries,  or  in  the  provision  of  particular  types  of  assets  for 
other  units.  One  aspect  of  compartmentalization  is  the 
separation  of  commercial  from  investment  banking,  what  is 
commonly  referred  to  as  Glass-Steagall  act.  In  addition,  special 8 
financing  arrangements  were  put  in  place  for  home  ownership, 
agricultural  credit,  exports,  and  rural  electrification.  The 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation,  a government  investment  bank, 
supervised  the  refinancing  of  banks,  railroads,  and  other 
industries,  and  acted  as  the  financing  backstop  for  a  myriad  of 
government  resource-development  programs. 
In  the  same  spate  of  legislation  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
was  reorganized.  The  real  bills  doctrine  was  removed  from  the 
rules  that  determined  the  currency  supply  and  access  to  Federal 
Reserve  credit.  Furthermore,  government  debt  became  eligible  as 
an  asset  to  offset  Federal  Reserve  currency  liabilities. 
Deposit  insurers,  a  new  set  of  agencies.  were  created  to 
take  over  the  responsibilities  for  assuring  that  bank  deposits 
were  always  available  at  par  from  the  Federal  Reserve.  The 
various  deposit  insurance  funds  carried  an  implicit  Government 
endorsement  or  guarantee  of  their  commitments,  up  to  limits  set 
by  Congress.  One  principle  of  the  initial  legislation,  which  was 
not  honored  in  our  recent  experience,  was  that  small  deposits 
were,  and  large  deposits  were  not,  so  guaranteed. 
The  doctrine  of  transparency  really  reflects  a  recognition 
that  the  United  States  is  a  capitalist  economy  in  which  the 
corporate  form  of  organizing  business  dominates.  The 
transparency  principle  holds  that  truthful  information,  on  the 
financial  condition  of  corporations  and  of  activity  in  those 
markets  in  which  initial  underwriting  takes  place  and  in  which 
"second  hand"  securities  are  sold,  was  to  be  publicly  available. 
In  addition,  the  markets  in  which  financial  instruments  were  sold 
and  bought  were  to  be  free  of  manipulation,  either  by  market 
makers,  corporate  management,  or  third  parties. 
The  transparency  principle  is  necessary  for  the  operation  of 
a  market-  rather  than  an  institution-based  financial  system. 9 
Revelations  of  scandals  in  investment  banking,  combined  with  the 
losses  of  investors  as  the  Dow  Jones  fell  to  some  15%  of  its  pre 
crash  value,  meant  that  by  1933  public's  confidence  in  the 
integrity  of  investment  markets  and  in  the  wisdom  in 
participating  was  low.  The  revival  of  confidence  in  banks  and 
saving  institutions  was  facilitated  by  Federal  government  deposit 
insurance. 
There  was  no  possibility  of  a  similar  government 
intervention  to  guarantee  the  value  of  other  assets.  Revival  of 
confidence  in  market-based  debt  and  equity  financing  required 
some  guaranty  of  the  integrity  of  corporate  management  and 
financial  markets.  The  New  Deal  legislation  founding  the 
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  set  standards  for  corporate 
reporting  and  governance,  for  the  information  that  needs  to 
accompany  a  public  security  offering,  and  for  the  operations  of 
(and  the  flow  of  information  from)  second-hand  markets  for 
securities.  One  difference  between  economies  with  "universal 
banking"  and  economies  with  a division  between  what  banks  finance 
and  what  markets  finance  is  in  the  public  confidence  in  the 
integrity  of  markets  and  corporate  governance.  The  securities 
and  exchange  legislation  may  well  be  one  of  the  most  successful 
reform  efforts  of  the  New  Deal  era:  without  it,  today's  market 
oriented  financial  system  would  not  be  feasible. 
Loan  officers  of  banks  are  professionals,  skilled  in  the 
evaluation  of  privately  submitted  and  often  confidential 
information  about  the  operations  of  businesses,  households,  and 
government  units  that  require  financing.  The  loan  officer  joke, 
to  the  effect  that  he  has  never  seen  a pro  forma  that  he  did  not 
like,  accurately  reflects  the  loan  officer  process,  which  seeks 
to  transform  the  optimistic  views  of  profit  expectations  put 
forth  by  potential  borrowers  into  realistic  expectations  which 10 
can  be  submitted  to  and  endorsed  by  loan  oversight  committees  of 
the  bank.  The  underwriting  process,  combined  with  the  input  of 
security  analysts,  plays  a  similar  role  for  publicly  traded 
securities.  10 
The  remark  about  pro  formas  cited  earlier  identifies  the 
role  of  loan  officers  in  the  chain  of  financing:  loan  officers 
are  the  designated  skeptics  of  the  economy,  who  nevertheless  make 
their  living  by  accepting  risks  that  they  understand.  In market- 
based  financing,  underwriting  and  security  analysts  are  assumed 
to  play  roles  similar  to  that  of  banker,  but  the  continuing 
commitment  to  both  the  borrower  and  the  lender  that  often 
characterize  a  bank's  relations  with  borrowers  and  depositors  is 
in  general  lacking  in  market-based  financing  arrangements. 
The  1930s  reorganization 
When  the  Federal  Reserve  was  created  after  the  crisis  of 
1907  the  belief  was  that  the  problem  of  the  instability  of  the 
banking  system  was  put  to  rest.  As  the  Federal  Reserve  was  not 
able  to  take  an  equity  position  in  an  otherwise  bankrupt  bank, 
the  Federal  Reserve  was  unable  to  contain  the  solvency  crisis  of 
the  banking  system  that  climaxed  in  1933.  The  resolution  of  the 
crisis  of  1933  involved  an  infusion  of  equity  by  the 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation  into  banks  that  were  bankrupt 
on  a mark-to-market  basis. 
The  creation  of  federal  deposit  insurance  institutions  for 
commercial  banks,  savings  and  loan  organizations,  and  credit 
unions  diluted  the  authority  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  A 
natural  and  normal  result  of  deposit  insurance  is  the  setting  of 
standards  for  coverage  and  a  mechanism  of  supervision, 
regulation,  and  examination,  which  assures  the  insurer  that  the 11 
insured  conforms  to  set  standards.  Regulation,  supervision,  and 
examination  are  natural  functions  of  an  insuring  authority. 
The  original  Federal  Reserve  act  based  the  reserves  of 
member  banks  on  bank  rediscounting  of  eligible  paper  at  the 
discount  window  of  the  district  Federal  Reserve  Banks. 
Rediscounting  was  not  a  lender-of-last-resort  activity  reserved 
for  a  crisis,  it  was  the  mechanism  by  which  part  of  the  normal 
reserve  base  of  banks  was  brought  into  being.  By  being  the 
channel  through  which  the  demand  for  reserves  by  banks  led  to  the 
creation  of  reserves,  the  discount  window  made  the  ability  of 
banks  to  lend  responsive  to  the  needs  of  trade.  In  the  original 
Federal  Reserve  act  bank  reserves  were  endogenously  determined. 
The  underlying  theory  of  the  original  act  was  that  the 
responsiveness  of  the  banking  system  to  the  needs  of  trade  (made 
possible  by  the  reserve  base  of  banks  being  endogenously 
determined  by  the  rediscounting  of  eligible  paper  at  the 
district  Federal  Reserve  Banks)  combined  with  the  Federal 
Reserve's  generalized  oversight  of  the  banking  system,  would 
result  in  a  banking  and  financing  structure  that  was  safe  and 
secure,  and  which  also  facilitated  the  capital  development  of  the 
economy.  Changes  in  the  posted  rediscount  rate  at  a  District 
Bank  were  to  take  place  only  as  the  Bank  suffered  a  loss  of  gold, 
either  through  the  foreign  exchanges  or  through  an  internal 
drain.  Federal  Reserve  actions  were  not  to  try  to  fight 
projected  inflation  or  otherwise  manage  the  economy. 
In  the  original  structure,  the  District  Banks  were  lenders 
to  member  banks.  As  lenders,  the  District  Banks  had  a  right  to 
information  about  the  prudence  of  their  member  banks  who  were 
regular  borrowers.  The  use  of  the  discount  window  as  a  normal 
source  of  financing  by  member  banks  legitimated  the  regulation, 12 
supervision,  and  examination  of  member  banks  by  the  Federal 
Reserve. 
The  Federal  Reserve  had  been  created  because  in  the  first 
decade  of  the  century  the  government  debt  was  too  small  to  be  the 
basis  of  a currency  supply  and  a banking  system  that  responded  to 
the  needs  of  trade,  i.e.,  that  facilitated  the  capital 
development  of  the  economy.  Making  government  debt  eligible  as 
an  asset  for  the  note  issuing  department  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
Banks  was  viewed  as  an  emergency  provision  when  it  was  first 
introduced  during  the  crisis  of  1932,  and  not  as  a  change  in  the 
normal  operating  procedure.  Aside  from  periods  of  crisis,  the 
Federal  Reserve  System's  interaction  with  the  economy  was  still 
expected  to  be  based  on  the  discount  window. 
The  bank  currency  of  the  United  States  under  the  National 
Banking  Act  was  based  upon  the  Government  debt  that  banks 
deposited  with  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency.  The  fiscal 
policy  of  the  United  States  after  the  Civil  War  led  to  a  shortage 
of  government  debt  which,  in  turn,  meant  that  the  creation  of 
bank  money  and  the  financing  available  from  the  banking  system 
were  not  responsive  to  the  needs  of  trade.11 
Legislation  of  1932-35,  which  allowed  the  use  of  government 
debt  as  asset  offsets  for  currency,  did  not  abolish  the 
rediscount  facilities  at  the  District  Banks.  The  expectation  was 
that  after  recovery  a  resumption  of  fiscal  orthodoxy  would  once 
again  make  government  debt  scarce.  This  would  enable  the 
discount  window  to  resume  its  rightful  place  as  the  source  of  the 
banking  system's  response  to  the  needs  of  trade. 
This  expectation  was  falsified  by  the  enormous  growth  of 
government  debt  during  the  Second  World  War.  In  spite  of  the 
Korean,  Vietnam,  and  Cold  wars,  over  the  1946-1980  period 
government  debt  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  fell,  ratifying  the 13 
expectations  of  the  1930’s.  As  a  result  of  the  destruction  of 
the  federal  fiscal  system  following  the  election  of  1980, 
government  debt  relative  to  GNP  increased  dramatically.  Today, 
and  for  the  foreseeable  future,  policy  dealing  with  the  structure 
of  government  supervision,  regulation,  and  examination  of 
financial  institutions  has  to  reflect  expectations  that  a 
government-debt-based  money  supply  will  be  the  rule.12 
Whether  the  structure  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  that 
created  district  Reserve  Banks  to  process  eligible  paper  and  to 
create  thereby  the  reserve  base  for  commercial  banks  is  an  apt 
structure  for  a Central  Bank  that  operates  by  way  of  open  market 
operations  has  never  been  faced.  There  may  very 
mismatch  between  the  structure  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
the  manner  in  which  it  interacts  with  the  economy: 
window  central  bank  is  different  than  an  open  market 
central  bank. 
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V.  Today's  Capitalism 
The  financial  systems  of  today's  capitalisms  are  not  the 
financial  systems  of  1907  or  of  1936.  Over  the  half-century 
since  the  end  of  World  War  II  there  has  not  been  a  traumatic 
collapse  of  financial  markets,  such  as  had  often  occurred  during 
the  century  prior  to  1940.  Historically,  such  collapses  had 
marked  the  beginning  of  a  deep  and  long-lasting  depression.  One 
reason  for  this  change  is  that  the  reserves  are  now  based  upon 
government  debt.  This  means  that  a  decline  in  reserves  and  in 
the  supply  of  money  need  no  longer  be  a  result  of  a  decline  in 
business  activity  which  lowers  the  demand  for  bank 
accommodations.  Furthermore,  with  government  debt  available  for 
bank  portfolios  the  reserve  base  and  bank  deposits  will  be 14 
sustained  even  if  bank  lending  to  business  and  households 
decreases. 
An  additional  and  equally  important  reason  for  the  absence 
of  a  deep  depression  is  that  in  a  big-government  capitalism  a 
fall  in  investment  does  not  mean  that  capital  incomes  collapse, 
which  is  what  normally  happened  in  a  deep  recession  or 
depression.  This  is  so  because  government  deficits  are  the 
equivalent  of  investment  in  sustaining  aggregate  capital 
incomes.  13 
Stabilization  policy 
Stabilization  policy  is  effective  as  it  stabilizes  aggregate 
profits.  The  great  collapse  of  asset  values  in  the  1930's 
occurred  primarily  because  capital  incomes  (current,  recent,  and 
expected)  had  fallen  and  only  secondarily  because  the  discounting 
factor  had  risen.14  The  increased  preference  for  liquidity 
decreases  the  capitalization  rate  for  capital  assets  and  equities 
when  financial  traumas  occur,  but  in  the  small-government 
capitalism,  such  as  that  which  ruled  in  1929-33,  the  numerators 
in  the  present-value  formula  (the  capital  asset  pricing  relation) 
first  fell  slightly,  and  then  precipitously,  as  investment 
tapered  off  and  then  collapsed.  The  double  whammy  of  increased 
liquidity  preference  and  decreased  profits  was  responsible  for 
the  fall  in  asset  values  being  greater  than  the  fall  in  the 
consumer  price  level  and  in  an  index  of  the  wages  of  employed 
workers. 
In  our  recent  experience  the  main  stabilizing  device  that 
prevented  the  financial  fiascos  of  the  late  1980's  and  early 
1990's  from  turning  into  a  depression  was  the  government's 
deficit.  One  new  aspect  of  the  economy  is  the  growth  of  managed 
monies  in  the  form  of  pension  and  mutual  funds.  These  funds  are 15 
contingent  value  instruments.  The  day-to-day  value  of  these 
funds  depends  upon  a  daily  marking  to  market  of  the  portfolios. 
A  run  from  these  funds  will  lower  asset  values,  for  the  need  to 
liquidate  assets  to  satisfy  redemptions  is  likely  to  force  the 
market  price  of  securities  down. 
In  an  earlier  epoch,  when  bank  "fixed-dollar"  liabilities 
were  a  main  asset  of  households,  a  bank  failure  would  lead  to 
frozen  assets.  Depositors  would  receive  partial  payments  as  the 
assets  in  a  failed  bank  would  be  liquidated.  Even  though  there 
is  no  margin  of  safety,  such  as  is  provided  by  bank  equity,  for 
the  asset  value  of  mutual  funds,  there  is  also  no  danger  that  the 
front  of  the  line  can  withdraw  100%  of  a  deposit  but  those  who 
are  further  back  receive  only  the  value  that  can  be  achieved 
through  the  time-consuming  process  of  liquidation. 
A  stabilization  policy  that  relies  mainly  upon  government 
deficits  to  sustain  profits  and  stimulate  private  investment,  and 
government  surpluses  to  constrain  profits,  prices,  and  exuberant 
investment,  requires  the  discipline  of  a  fiscal  policy  that  does 
not  allow  the  quality  of  government  debt  to  be  compromised.  This 
implies  that  at  normal  times  the  fiscal  posture  of  the  government 
leads  to  a  substantially  smaller  rate  of  increase  of  outstanding 
debt  than  of  gross  domestic  product,  but  when  GDP  falls  by  a 
significant  amount  from  the  "full-employment  level"  then  the  rate 
of  increase  of  government  debt  becomes  substantially  greater  than 
that  of  GDP.  The  tight  rein  that  such  an  income-sensitive  fiscal 
policy  imposes  acts  as  a  significant  constraint  upon  inflation. 
Such  a  big-government  tight  fiscal  policy  regime  allows 
monetary  policy  to  be  relatively  passive.  In  big-government 
capitalism,  monetary  policy  has  only  one  arrow  to  fire  in 
constraining  an  exuberant  expansion.  It  can  make  financing 
through  banks  relatively  scarce  and  very  expensive;  i.e., monetary  policy  is  effect ive  with  a  s  lack  fiscal  posture  only  as 
it  induces  a  crunch.  A  policy  posture  that  aims  at  portfolio 
conservatism  by  creating  crunches  and  threats  of  debt  deflations 
will  lower  economic  growth  by  lowering  of  the  overall  ratio  of 
attained  GDP  to  potential  GDP.15 
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VI.  Policy 
As  my  colleague  Ronnie  J.  Phillips  recently  pointed  out,  in 
1935  few  believed  that  the  agenda  of  banking  reform  was 
completed.16  One  unfinished  item  on  the  agenda  was  to  clean  up 
bank  examination  by  unifying  examination  under  the  independent 
government  corporation,  the  FDIC.  As  Phillips  reports,  the 
argument  was  that  the  FDIC  and  the  Treasury  (as the  guarantor  of 
the  ability  of  the  FDIC  to  pay  off  depositors  as  necessary)  had 
resources  at  hazard  in  the  guarantee  of  the  nominal  value  of  bank 
deposits.  This  made  them  the  appropriate  organizations  to  carry 
out  bank  examination. 
Liquidity  and  Solvency  Crises 
In  1935  only  one  "solvency"  crisis,  that  of  1933,  had 
occurred  since  the  Federal  Reserve  System  was  in  place.  In  that 
experience,  the  Federal  Reserve  System  had  been  unable  to  prevent 
the  collapse  of  the  banking  and  financial  system.  Furthermore, 
the  reopening  of  the  banks  after  the  holiday  was  under  the 




to  supply  equity  funds. 
We  now  have  had  a  second  experience  with  a  solvency  crisis. 
again  the  Federal  Reserve  was  not  a  main  player  in  paying 
and  sustaining  bank  and  savings  and  loan  association 17 
liabilities  at  par.  The  major  placers  were  the  insurance  funds 
and  the  Treasury. 
Whereas  the  Federal  Reserve  has  been  the  main  player  in 
inducing  and  containing  liquidity  crises  the  Federal  Reserve  was 
not  the  main  player  in  resolving  the  solvency  crises  of  1929-33 
and  1988-92.  The  Federal  Reserve  has  not  been  able  to  contain 
and  offset  crises  that  were  due  to  a  plethora  of  non-performing 
assets  on  the  books  of  banks  and  financial  institutions. 
The  resolution  of  solvency  crises,  which  are  characterized 
by  non-performing  assets,  requires  an  equity  infusion.  This 
requires  that  either  a  government  investment  bank  infuses  equity 
into  negative  net  worth  institutions,  or  a  government 
"liquidator"  puts  up  enough  "equity"  funds  into  failed 
institutions  so  that  the  guaranteed  or  insured  liabilities  are 
paid  off  at  par. 
The  "government  investment  bank"  route  leads  to  the 
continued  operation  of  the  failed  bank,  and  often  of  the  debtors 
whose  liabilities  are  the  non  performing  assets  of  the  failed 
bank.  For  both  the  bank  and  the  debtor,  the  equity  infusion 
often  leads  to  the  treatment  of  the  debtor  whose  liabilities  are 
not  performing  as  a work-out  situation.  On  both  the  bank  and  the 
bank  customer's  side  the  government  investment  bank  route  leaves 
valuable  organizations  intact,  even  if  the  management  responsible 
for  the  non-performing  assets  is  replaced. 
The  "government  liquidator"  route  pays  off  depositors, 
closes  down  the  failed  bank,  forecloses  on  debtors,  and  proceeds 
to  sell  the  assets  of  the  failed  bank  and  bank  customers  as 
rapidly  as  is  deemed  feasible.  The  "government  investment  bank" 
work-out  route  may  be  a more  effective  way  to  deal  with  a  crisis 
that  is  due  to  non-performing  assets  than  a  "liquidator"  route. 18 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  bank  holiday,  the  Reconstruction 
Finance  Corporation  placed  equity  in  some  l/3  of  the  closed  banks 
(l/Z  of  the  banks  that  reopened).  As  recovery  took  place,  the 
equity  injection  by  the  RFC  was  undone,  either  by  the  sale  of  the 
equity  interest  in  the  market  or  by  a  repurchase  of  the  RFC's 
investment  out  of  retained  earnings.  On  the  whole,  the 
investments  in  failed  banks  yielded  sufficient  funds  so  that  the 
costs  to  the  government  were  nil:  no  permanent  increase  in  the 
government  debt  occurred  because  of  the  recapitalization 
exercise. 
It  seems  as  if  there  will  be  a  permanent  increase  in  the 
government's  dead  weight  debt  due  to  the  costs  of  the 
bankruptcies  of  savings  and  loan  associations  and  banks  in  the 
1988-1992  period.  It  is  worth  investigating  whether  a  permanent 
government  investment  bank,  such  as  the  Reconstruction  Finance 
Corporation,  is  a desirable  feature  for  an  economy  where  solvency 
crises  are  likely  to  occur.17 
100%  Money,  or  The  National  Banking  Act  Redux 
The  National  Banking  Act  provided  for  a  currency  that  was 
based  upon  United  States  Government  bonds  that  the  currency- 
issuing  banks  deposited  at  the  Office  of  the  Comptroller.  Today 
our  currency  is  based  upon  Government  bonds  that  are  held  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  System.  The  "great  experiment"  of  basing  the 
currency  supply  upon  private  debts  monetized  by  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  was  terminated  by  the  combination  of  the  Great 
Depression,  the  great  war,  and  the  attenuation  of  the  revenue 
base  of  the  Federal  Government  in  the  1980's. 
Furthermore,  the  government  debt  is  big  enough  so  that  the 
deposit  liabilities  of  the  commercial  and  savings  banks  could  be 
offset  by  government  bonds.  We  can  now  have  a  banking  system  in 19 
which  the  banks  hold  interest-bearing  reserves  at  the  Federal 
Reserve  Banks  equal  to  100%  of  their  deposits,  subject  to  check, 
and  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  hold  government  bonds  to  offset 
their  currency  and  bank  reserve  liabilities.  This  would  give  us 
a  monetary  system  in  which  currency  and  deposits  are  fully 
equivalent  in  the  assets  by  which  they  are  offset  on  the  books  of 
commercial  and  Federal  Reserve  banks.  The  conditions  for  100% 
money  are  satisfied.18 
We  are  rapidly  moving  towards  an  economy  where  money  will 
take  on  new  forms.  We  not  only  make  purchases  by  electronically 
setting  up  debits  on  various  credit  and  payment  cards,  but  we  can 
expect  eexpect  the  currency  in  our  pockets  soon  to  take  the  form 
form  of  a  smart  card  with  an  encoded  value,  which  we  will  run 
down  by  transferring  credits  by  way  of  smart  "cash  registers"  to 
the  vendor's  account. 
As  they  transfer  purchasing  power  from  from  the  account  of 
one  agent  to  that  of  another,  payment  systems  use  resources.  The 
great  innovation  in  the  payment  and  credit  card  revolution  was 
the  vendor's  discount  as  the  way  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  payments 
system.  One  way  to  pay  for  the  payments  system  in  a  world  of 
100%  money  is  to  use  the  interest  on  the  government's  sebt  owned 
by  the  banking  system  to  cover  the  costs  of  the  system.  But  this 
would  mean  that  the  safety  and  security  of  that  goes  with  a 
default-free  income-yielding  asset  would  not  be  readily  available 
to  the  general  public.  The  alternative  would  be  for  the  banks  to 
pay  a competetive  rate  on  deposits  and  to  put  in place  a  fee-for- 
services  system  to  pay  for  check-clearing  and  the  use  of  the 
electronic  payment  system.  There  may  be  no  issue  of  principle  in 
the  choice,  except  that  a  fee-for-services  system  can  yield  an 
open-access  system,  which  would  treat  large  and  small  asset 
owners  equally.  Such  a  consideration  may  swing  the  choice  in 20 
favor  of  a  combination  of  fees  for  services  and  the  vendor's 
discount  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  payments  system. 
One  aspect  of  the  100%  money  schemes  was  that  debt  financing 
of  businesses  and  households  was  to  be  divorced  from  the  payments 
systems  and  the  provision  of  instruments  that  are  both  free  of 
default  and  always  have  a  fixed  nominal  value.  This  can  be 
accomplished  by  making  contingent  value  assets  the  standard  for 
the  indirect  holding  by  households  of  paper  that  finances 
business  and  household  debts.  Current  trends  are  running  in 
favor  of  mutual  funds  becoming  the  principal  vehicle  by  which 
households  own  business  equities  and  debts.  These  fund 
liabilities  have  values  based  upon  the  market  value  of  a 
portfolio.  This  mutual  fund  financing  technique  is  now  mainly 
used  for  instruments  that  are  purchased  on  the  basis  of  generally 
available  information. 
Banks,  through  their  loan  officer  function,  are  specialists 
in  making  loans  on  the  basis  of  their  "hard  reading"  of  private 
information,  which  they  obtain  in  the  process  of  deciding  whether 
and  on  what  terms  to  accommodate  a  potential  borrowing  client. 
As  a  substitute  for  bank  lending,  such  loans  can  be  the  province 
of  special  mutual  funds  that  break  down  the  flow  of  funds  from 
business  and  household  financing  into  tranches,  such  that  there 
is  a  fixed-income  portion  with  a  market  value  that  is  protected 
and  a  variable-income  tranche  that  "protects"  the  fixed-income 
and  value  tranche.  These  funds  would  be  so  structured  that  the 
variable-income  portion  would  have  a  high  expected  return  but 
would  also  absorb  the  first,  say,  10%  of  losses  due  to  non- 
performing  assets:  interest  rate  risk  could  be  finessed  by  making 
all  credits  floating-rate  credits. 
Thus,  as  the  21st  century  is  about  to  be  ushered  in,  an  idea 
which  was  on  the  table  during  the  1930's  discussion  of  reform  can 21 
once  again  be  on  the  table.  One  virtue  of  the  100%  money  scheme 
is  that  it  separates  the  two  functions  that  the  monetary  and 
banking  system  has  to  perform:  the  provision  of  a  safe  and  secure 
means  of  payments,  and  the  capital  development  of  the  economy. 
By  separating  these  functions  it  makes  us  aware  that  an  economy 
can  have  too  little,  as  well  as  too  much,  government  debt. 
We  now  are  in  a position  to  realize  the  dual  set-up  of  100% 
money:  financing  the  capital  development  of  the  economy  by 
contingent-valued  liabilities  such  as  mutual  funds,  and  a 
payments  mechanism  that  is  based  upon  a  portfolio  of  government 
bonds  that  is  held  by  the  authority  responsible  for  the  payment 
system.  The  weakness  of  the  mutual  fund  way  of  financing 
business  is  that  the  position-taker,  the  manager  of  a  mutual 
fund,  does  not  hazard  his  capital  in  order  to  protect  the  fund 
holders  against  loss  of  principal.  A  surrogate  for  bank  capital 
in  the  form  of  a  high-risk,  high-expected-return  tranche  in  the 
portfolio  will  need  to  be  developed. 
In  a  capitalist  world,  other  people's  money  is  put  at  risk 
by  corporate  managements  and  portfolio  managers  of  various  kinds. 
This  is  true  to  a greater  extent  now  than  ever  before,  because  of 
the  wider  spread  of  wealth,  albeit  mostly  in  small  accumulations, 
that  has  been  realized.  One  way  of  protecting  today's  asset 
owners  is  by  broad  public  information  widely  disseminated:  by 
transparency. 
Compartmentalization  and  Transparency  for  the  21st  Century 
Like  every  application  of  principles,  compartmentalization 
and  transparency  need  to  be  adjusted  for  the  realities  of 
institutions  and  usages.  The  compartmentalization  of 
institutions  by  function,  so  prominent  in  the  1935  structure,  has 
largely  been  eroded.  As  we  prepare  for  the  21st  century  we  have 22 
to  adjust  the  still-valid  concepts  of  compartmentalization  and 
transparency  to  the  technology  of  the  21st  century  and  our 
understanding  of  how  our  economy  functions. 
The  securitization  of  home  mortgages  and  automobile  loans, 
an  adjustment  that  reflected  the  increase  in  the  weight  of  mutual 
and  pension  funds  as  the  proximate  holders  of  market  instruments 
reflecting  primary  loans,  has  changed  the  operations  of  both 
savings  banks  and  consumer  sales  finance  companies.  Furthermore, 
the  holding  company  format  that  now  allows  commercial  banks  and 
mutual  funds  to  be  under  the  same  corporate  umbrella,  and  which 
we  can  expect  will  be  opened  to  allow  commercial  and  investment 
banking  to  co-exist  under  a holding  company  format,  has  virtually 
erased  the  functional  segmentation  of  commercial  and  investment 
banking. 
Legislation  and  administrative  decisions  that  eliminate  most 
of  the  barriers  to  nation  wide  branch  banking  are  now  being 
implemented.  This  paves  the  way  for  the  elimination  of 
geographical  segmentation. 
One  element  in  the  stagnation  of  the  British  economy  over 
the  past  century  has  been  the  ever-greater  concentration  of 
banking  into  a  small  number  of  national  branch  systems,  even  as  a 
rich  mix  of  fringe  banking  organizations,  such  as  exist  in 
Germany  and  Italy,  never  arose.  The  prudent  banker  rule  of 
thumb,  often  made  part  of  the  regulatory  structure,  provides  for 
the  distribution  of  credits  so  that  no  more  than  10%  or  15%  of 
equity  (in  principle  capital,  retained  earnings,  and 
undistributed  profits)  can  be  allocated  to  any  one  credit. 
This  lO%-to-15%-of-capita1  rule  determines  the  natural  loan 
size  habitat  of  a  banking  group.  For  example,  an  eight-percent 
capital-to-total  assets  rule  means  that  a  100  million-dollar  bank 
would  have  8 million  dollars  in  capital.  The  maximum  credit  line 23 
of  such  an  institution  would  be  from  $800,000  to  $1,200,000.  In 
the  American  scene  as  it  now  is,  any  bank  with  $l,OOO,OOO  or  less 
as  its  maximum  credit  line  is  a  bank  for  smaller  business.  By 
the  same  rule,  a  1 billion-dollar  bank  will  have  an  80  million- 
dollar  capital  and  a  maximum  credit  line  of  8  to  12  million 
dollars,  and  a  100  billion-dollar  bank  would  have  a  maximum 
credit  line  of  800  million  to  1,200  million  dollars. 
The  opening  of  the  gates  to  nationwide  branch  banking  will 
see  an  amalgamation  of  smaller  banks  into  state,  regional,  and 
national  banks.  Every  case  of  amalgamation  will  increase  the 
capital,  and  therefore  the  maximum  line  of  credit  that  can  be 
given  to  any  one  customer.  A  movement  of  banks  to  higher  natural 
habitats  will  take  place.  The  progress  to  a  small  number  of 
banks,  each  one  of  which  is  too  big  to  fail,  with  maximum  credit 
lines  so  large  that  the  conditions  of  supply  of  credit  to  large 
borrowers  will  improve  relative  to  the  conditions  of  supply  of 
credit  to  small  borrowers,  seems  to  be  a  most  likely  outcome  of 
what  is  now  taking  place. 
A  series  of  rules  that  segments  banking  by  bank  size  seems 
in  order  if  small  businesses  are  to  receive  adequate  financing  as 
the  consolidation  proceeds.  The  idea  of  special  rules  as  well  as 
special  support  organizations  for  community  banks  needs  to  be 
explored." 
VII.  A  Modest  Proposal 
The  time  has  come  to  open  a  national  inquiry  into  the 
structure  of  the  banking  and  financial  system.  The  radical 
changes  now  underway  in  technology,  computing,  and  communication 
mean  that  much  of  what  we  now  have  may  be  obsolete.  The  sluggish 
economy  of  the  past  decades,  combined  with  the  apparent 24 
reluctance  of  the  Federal  Reserve  to  give  full  employment  a 
chance,  can  mean  that  our  financing  structures  are  not  consistent 
with  the  needs  of  a progressive  democracy. 
In  the  past,  serious  changes  were  the  result  of  serious 
public  inquiries.  I  suggest  that  enough  is  amiss  in  our 
financial  and  banking  structures  that  it  is  time  to  go  back  to 
the  drawing  board  and  determine  what  the  monetary,  financial,  and 
financing  arrangements  should  be  in  the  21st  century.  A  late 
20th  century  National  Monetary  Commission  should  be  on  the  public 
policy  agenda. 25 
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